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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the effects of FDI on domestic employment by examining the data
of Taiwan’s manufacturing industry. Treating domestic production and overseas production as two
distinctive outputs from a joint production function, we may estimate the effect of overseas
production on the demand for domestic labor. We found that overseas production generally reduces
the demand for domestic labor as overseas products serve as a substitute for primary inputs in
domestic production (substitution effect). But overseas production also allows the investor to expand
its domestic output through enhanced competitiveness. The expanded domestic output leads to more
employment at home (output effect). 
The net effect of FDI on domestic employment is a combination of substitution and output
effects. For Taiwan, the net effect is positive in most cases but it differs across the labor group.
Technical workers tend to benefit most from FDI, followed by managerial workers, and blue-collar
workers benefit the least; indeed they may even be adversely affected. This suggests that after FDI,
a reconfiguration of division of labor within a firm tend to shift the domestic production toward
technology and management intensive operations.
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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been a concern of policymakers that foreign direct investment (FDI) may 
cause job losses at home; indeed, labor unions generally consider FDI to be the 
equivalent of job exporting. The logic is simple; as production lines are relocated 
overseas, gone with them are the workers that served the domestic lines. This 
reasoning is of course over-simplistic, because there could never be any guarantees 
that the production lines that were relocated overseas would have been able to survive 
the competition had they remained at home. If these production lines were to be 
eliminated anyway, then their relocation does not result in any job losses.   
  Conversely, there is always the possibility that overseas investment might well 
enhance the overall competitiveness of the investing company and therefore boost job 
opportunities at home which would otherwise have been swept away by competition. 
Ku (1998), for example, found that FDI enabled Taiwanese enterprises to restructure 
themselves, and therefore increase their tenacity. They showed that firms engaging in 
overseas production had a better chance of survival than those that were not. 
  Those who are concerned about the adverse effects of overseas investment on 
domestic employment basically assume that overseas production is a substitute for 
exports; hence, as exports fall, so does employment. This is a conventional argument 
along the lines of Mundell (1957) who showed very elegantly, in a 2×2 model, that capital 
movement is equivalent to trade. Products produced in overseas locations not only replace 
exports, they may also in fact be re-imported back home to substitute the product lines 
that were previously imported to serve the home market (Liu and Lin 2001). There are, 
however, counter-arguments to Mundell’s ‘perfect substitution’ theory. Markusen 
(1983), for example, demonstrated the theoretical possibility that FDI and trade are 
complementary rather than substitutes; therefore, the relationship between FDI and 
job opportunities at home is indeed an empirical question.     2
  Brainard and Riker (1997a, 1997b) directly estimated the substitution elasticities 
between employment in parent companies and their foreign affiliates, as well as those 
between different affiliates, and found a very low degree of substitution between 
parent and affiliate employment, although there was a high degree of substitution 
between affiliates in developing counties. They also found that the relationship 
between employment in industrialized country affiliates and in developing countries 
was complementary rather than substituting.   
  Slaughter (1995) had earlier found a similar low degree of substitution between 
parent and affiliate employment when only production workers were considered. He 
noted that the employment of production workers did not seem to be systematically 
related to relative wages between the parent and the affiliate. This suggests that 
overseas employment corresponds only weakly to the wage gap between home and 
host countries, although it may correspond strongly to the wage gap between different 
overseas locations. Hatzius (1997) and Döhrn (1997) found similar results for Sweden 
with overseas employment of Swedish multinational firms corresponding to wages in 
actual and potential host countries, but not to wages in Sweden. Blomstrom and 
Kokko (2000) also discovered that Swedish multinationals relate to domestic policies 
rather than wages in determining whether to keep production at home. 
  This evidence suggests that overseas production and domestic production is 
closely related, but not necessary substitutable. In fact, there must be a division of 
labor between the parent and affiliates since FDI is an action taken to enhance the 
competitiveness of a company. To the extent that FDI reduces the costs of the parent’s 
operations, it also helps the parent to expand its level of output, which in turn, 
increases employment at home. Blomstrom, et. al. (1997), for example, found that 
overseas investment in developing countries by US firms did have the effect of 
replacing domestic employment, but the same investment in developed countries did   3
not; the replacement effect was, however, limited to production workers. 
  Findings that the employment effect from FDI may differ across labor groups are 
important, for this implies that FDI has important consequences for income distribution. 
For example, the examination of Swedish firms by Blomstrom, et. al. (1997) found that 
FDI contributes to growth in employment of unskilled labor at home because Swedish 
multinationals were investing abroad to acquire skilled workers to engage in R&D and 
other skills-intensive activities. Lipsey’s (1994) study of US multinationals also found 
that overseas affiliates allow the parent to employ more managerial and technical staff at 
the same level as in their domestic production. Feenstra (1996) showed that FDI in 
Mexico by US firms increased the demand at home for skilled workers vis-à-vis unskilled 
workers, thus raising the relative wage of skilled workers, and worsening income 
distribution for the investing country; whereas the reverse occurred in Mexico. 
  There is an indirect, but nevertheless very important, linkage between FDI and 
domestic employment; that is, the effect of FDI on domestic investment. If FDI 
outflows are accompanied by an equal reduction in the amount of domestic 
investment, then FDI may still reduce job opportunities at home even if overseas 
production is complementary to domestic production; Feldstein (1994) also seems to 
suggest such a one-to-one substitution effect. Stevens and Lipsey (1992) also found a 
negative relationship between FDI and domestic investment; although not as clear as 
one-to-one replacement; however, Bayoumi and Lipworth’s (1997) study of the case 
in Japan found no displacement effect on domestic investment from FDI. Again, the 
actual relationship is therefore an empirical question. 
  The purpose of this paper is therefore to examine the relationship between FDI and 
domestic employment at firm level, using Taiwan’s manufacturing industry as an example. 
We find that overseas production leads to an increase in the domestic employment of 
managerial and technical workers, but may also reduce the employment available to   4
unskilled workers. Overseas production partially replaces inputs to domestic production, 
resulting in a decline in labor demand at a given output level; however, at the same time 
overseas production reduces the costs of domestic production, leading to an expansion in 
output. These input-replacement and output-expansion effects combine to a produce a net 
effect which is positive in most cases, although the net effect differs with different labor 
groups and the geographical location of overseas investment. 
AN OVERVIEW OF TAIWAN’S FDI AND MANUFACTURING 
EMPLOYMENT 
Taiwanese firms made only sporadic outward investment before 1980. Beginning in 
the mid-1980s, Taiwanese firms started making more substantial foreign investment, 
driven by rising wages and rising value of Taiwanese currency, NT. Between 
1987-1990, Southeast Asia and USA were the major destinations of Taiwan’s foreign 
investment. In the early 1990s, China emerged in the FDI map and eventually became 
the most popular destination for Taiwanese investors. In the second half of the 1990s, 
China took up almost a half of Taiwan’s total amount of outward investment (see 
Table 1). The manufacturing sector accounted for the majority of overseas investment, 
dominating the service and agriculture sectors. In the manufacturing sector, FDI is 
most active in the electronics, chemical, and textile industries. FDI appears to have 
important consequences on domestic employment. 
 
Table 1    Taiwan’s Outward Investment by Location 




America Europe  China  Others  Total 
1952~90  1,077,710   1,844,332   115,171   0  39,298   3,076,511  
1991  929,819   658,958   60,289   174,158   6,964   1,830,188  
1992  369,929   449,096   45,933   246,992   22,301   1,134,251  
1993  663,514   740,110   255,913   3,168,411   1,398   4,829,346  
1994  559,471   988,336   22,209   962,209   46,748   2,578,973  
1995  467,743   787,105   59,868   1,092,713   42,162   2,449,591  
1996  661,717   1,442,953   11,875   1,229,241   48,859   3,394,645  
1997  818,743   1,915,948   58,508   4,334,313   100,627   7,228,139  
1998  580,819   2,637,021   33,828   2,034,621   44,634   5,330,923    5
1999  836,378   2,267,710   60,982   1,252,780   103,943   4,521,793  
2000  851,065   3,946,021   62,225   2,607,142   217,751   7,684,204  
2001  814,981   3,460,902   45,594   2,784,147   70,177   7,175,801  
2002  528,054   2,475,575   123,416   6,723,058   243,001   10,093,104  
Total  9,159,943   23,614,067   955,811   26,609,785   987,863   61,327,469  
 
Source:  Statistics on Overseas Chinese & Foreign Investment, Outward Investment, and Indirect Mainland Investment. 
Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
 
  Manufacturing employment in Taiwan reached a peak in 1987 when 2.821 million 
people were working in the manufacturing sector; thereafter, there was a general decline 
in manufacturing employment until it hit a trough in 1994, when 2.422 million people 
were working in the sector. It then started to recover through the mid- to late-1990s, with 

















Figure 1    Manufacturing employment, 1981-2000 
 
  The available employment data suggests that the period 1987-1994 was a time 
when Taiwan’s industry underwent dramatic restructuring. Whilst there were losses of 
399,000 manufacturing jobs throughout that period, there was nevertheless an 
increase in employment in the service sector of around 1.385 million, more than 
enough to offset these losses. Thus, unemployment rates remained at low levels 
throughout the 1990s.     6
  It is also worth noting that 1987 was around the time when Taiwanese firms began 
to embark on the course of FDI, with more than US$43 billion being invested overseas 
from 1987 to 2000. Between 1987 and 1992, FDI was concentrated in Southeast Asia 
where Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia took the lion’s share of Taiwan’s overseas 
investment; however, from 1992 onwards, the focus for FDI shifted to China. After the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, FDI in Southeast Asia came to a virtual standstill whereas 
FDI in China continued to surge. In 2001, the global recession saw Taiwan’s 
unemployment rate reaching an unprecedented 4 per cent; thus there were heightened 
fears that FDI may have led to rising unemployment at home. 
  Beneath the surface of a relatively stable employment situation in the 1990s, 
there was a rather dramatic transformation taking place in the industrial structure. 
Amongst 22 two-digit industries in the manufacturing sector, 12 had increased their 
employment levels whereas the remaining 10 had seen their employment levels 
falling. The most rapid increase in employment occurred in the electronics industry in 
which 145,748 new jobs had been generated between 1991 and 2000, representing a 
24.3 per cent increase on the 1990 level. It was probably no coincidence that the 
electronics industry was also the industry that was most active in undertaking outward 
investment. In contrast, employment in the apparel industry recorded the largest 
number of job losses, at 54,104, representing a loss of more than one-third of its initial 
1991 employment level. However, FDI from the apparel industry was also substantial; 
thus, the relationship between FDI and domestic employment is unclear, to say the 
least. In the following section, we will examine this relationship in more detail. 
THE STATISTICS ON FDI AND EMPLOYMENT 
In this section, we present the employment data revealed by Taiwan’s Manufacturing 
Census, and relate this to FDI. The census data are collected at plant level, but are   7
then aggregated into firm-level data; all of the following statistics are reported at firm 
level since it is considered that FDI is decided at firm level rather than plant level. 
Changes in employment between 1993 and 200 are studied, with 1993 having been 
chosen as the starting year because this was the first time that a comprehensive set of 
FDI statistics was collected in the census; 2000 is chosen as the terminal year because 
this was the most recent census year. A total of 75,101 firms are included in the 1993 
census, of which 49,260 had survived until 2000, whilst the remaining 25,841 had 
exited the market during the period under study. 27,585 new firms had entered the 
market between 1993 and 2000, with these new entries during this eight-year period 
representing 36.7 per cent of the stock of firms in the initial year, and the exiting firms 
representing 34.4 per cent of the stock, a characteristically high turnover rate for 
Taiwan’s industry (Aw, et. al., 2001). All firms that have shown up in either the 1993 
census or the 2000 census come to a total of 102,686, which forms our sample for 
comparison. 
  We classify all sample firms into two categories, the FDI group and the non-FDI 
group. The FDI group includes all firms that have undertaken overseas investment, 
and the non-FDI group includes those that have not undertaken any such investment. 
Although there are some missing data, the census does cover the majority of 
manufacturing firms. The total employment figures in the sample were 2,155,672 
persons for 1993, and 2,291,396 for 2000, representing 89.8 per cent and 92.9 per cent 
respectively of the total employment estimated by the statistics authorities during the 
two census years. 
  We tabulate the turnover of sample firms in Table 2, which shows that there were 
4,283 firms in the FDI group, and 98,403 firms in the non-FDI group. Although, in 
terms of the number of firms, the FDI group accounted for just 4.3 per cent of the 
manufacturing sector (ignoring the missing data), it nevertheless accounted for 28.23   8
per cent of total employment within the sector, which suggests that firms engaging in 
overseas investment are relatively large in size. 
 
Table 2    FDI and domestic employment, 1993-2000 
Unit: persons, % 
1993   2000 
Firm Group  No. of Firms 
Employment   %    Employment    % 
 FDI-Firms  4,283  608,501  28.23  689,769  30.10 
   Survivors  2,843  558,243  25.90  625,013  27.28 
   Exited  900  50,258  2.33  -  - 
   New  entrants  540  -  -  64,756  2.83 
 Non-FDI  firms  98,403  1,547,171  71.77  1,601,627  69.90 
   Survivors  46,417  1,119,060  51.91  1,055,421  46.06 
   Exited  24,941  428,111  19.86  -  - 
   New  entrants  27,045  -  -  546,206  23.84 
 Total  102,686  2,155,672  100.00  2,291,396  100.00 
 
  Out of the 4,283 firms in the FDI group, 3,743 firms were already in existence in 
1993; the remainder was made up of new firms that entered during the period under 
study. From the initial 1993 cohort, 2,843 had survived the competition and remained 
active within the industry in 2000, representing a 76.0 per cent survival rate.   
  Meanwhile, out of the 98,403 firms in the non-FDI group, 71,358 firms were 
already in existence in 1993, and 46,417 firms had survived up until 2000, 
representing a 65.0 per cent survival rate. Simple statistics suggest that those firms 
that were engaged in overseas investment had a higher survival rate, supporting the 
findings of Ku (1998) which, in a study of Taiwan’s electronics industry, showed that 
FDI did indeed increase the probability of survival. 
  Within our sample, the FDI group accounted for 28.23 per cent of all 
manufacturing sector employment in 1993, but by 2000, this figure had risen to 30.10 
per cent. If we count only those firms that were in existence in 1993, the employment 
share in 2000 was 27.28 per cent, representing only a slight fall on the 1993 
proportion despite the fact that a quarter of them had been eliminated in the interim 
period. In contrast, the non-FDI group accounted for 71.77 per cent of all 
manufacturing sector employment in 1993, and 69.90 per cent in 2000. However, if   9
new entrants are excluded, the surviving firms in the non-FDI group account for only 
46.06 per cent of employment in 2000. Simple statistics again suggest that FDI 
enabled investing firms to maintain more jobs at home. 
  It is worth noting that firms that exited the manufacturing industry during the 
period under study eliminated 478,369 jobs, or 22.2 per cent of the total employment 
in 1993. These losses were more than offset by the 610,962 jobs created by new 
entrants coming into the industry during the eight-year period. Total employment 
provided by those firms that survived the period is virtually unchanged; however, 
employment per firm increased by 12.0 per cent in the FDI group, in contrast to the 
5.7 per cent decline in the non-FDI group. 
THE EFFECT OF INVESTMENT LOCATION 
As demonstrated by Lipsey (1994) and Blomstrom, et. al. (1997), the employment 
effect of FDI may differ by investment location; thus, we should also examine the 
data on Taiwan to see whether geographical location matters. Taiwanese FDI has been 
concentrated in China since the early 1990s; however, there is one perspective which 
argues that investment in China is potentially more harmful to domestic employment 
than FDI in other regions. The reason for this, so the argument goes, is because of the 
cultural proximity and similarity in labor skills, with production in China being likely 
to duplicate what had previously been done in Taiwan and therefore exerting a strong 
substitution effect on domestic employment. 
 
  In order to examine the location effect, we classify those firms undertaking 
overseas investment into four subgroups according to the location of their investment. 
The first subgroup contains firms undertaking investment in China only; the second 
subgroup contains firms investing in China plus other regions; the third subgroup   10
contains firms investing in regions other than China; and the fourth subgroup contains 
firms with unknown FDI locations. Table 3 provides details of the level of 
employment for the four respective subgroups in 1993 and 2000. 
 














  China  1,048  122,179  116.58  112,710  107.55  -7.75 
    China and others  630  284,876  452.18  333,269  529.00  16.99 
    Other  than  China  692 101,698  146.96 135,752  196.17  33.49 
    Unknown  473 49,490 104.63 43,282  91.51 -12.54 
    Total  2,843 558,243  196.36 625,013  219.84  11.96 
 
Source:  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs,  Census of Manufacturers, 1993 & 2000. 
 
  As the table shows, of the 2,843 firms that undertook overseas investment and 
survived the 1993-2000 period, 1,048 had invested only in China, 630 had invested in 
China and somewhere else, 692 had invested only outside of China and the remainder 
had invested in unknown regions. Those investing only in China were apparently 
smaller in size as their average employment was only 116.58 in 1993, substantially 
lower than the average employment level for the entire FDI group; furthermore, the 
average employment of this subgroup declined again, to 107.55 employees, in 2000. 
In contrast, the subgroup investing only outside of China registered the highest 
growth rate in employment of all the subgroups, at 33.49 per cent, whilst firms that 
invested in China and other regions saw their employment rise by 16.99 per cent.   
  This seems to suggest that investing only in China undermines the investor’s 
capacity to maintain jobs at home; however, this conclusion is somewhat premature as 
there are other factors that may affect domestic employment after an enterprise invests 
abroad. Two obvious factors are firm size and industry. It is well established within 
the literature that firm size is positively correlated to the ability to invest abroad 
(Caves 1971; 1996). Large firms may therefore be more capable of undergoing 
internal restructuring after they have invested abroad and therefore more capable of   11
maintaining jobs at home (Chen and Ku, 2000). 
  Industry is also an important factor because a high-growth industry provides more 
opportunities for firms to diversify after they have invested abroad. In order to test the 
size and industry effects, we make a two-way classification of firms according to their 
size and industry affiliations; firms that employ more than 300 persons are classified as 
large firms, the rest are small firms. Industries that have grown by more than 30 per 
cent in output between 1993 and 2000 are considered to be ‘high-growth’ industries, 
otherwise they are ‘low-growth’ industries; the demarcation line of 30 per cent is the 
average growth rate in entire manufacturing output for the period under study. 
  We apply analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine how much FDI location 
matters when controlling for industry and size, and vice versa; the results are shown 
in Table 4 which indicates that when controlling for investment location, employment 
growth is significantly affected by both industry and size. Firms in the high-growth 
industries show a significantly higher employment growth rate than those in the 
low-growth industries, whilst large firms show a significantly higher employment 
growth rate than small firms. 
 
Table 4    Change in employment, 1993-2000 (ANOVA) 
 
Industry Size 










China 0.017  0.812  3.27  *  0.044  4.238  27.43**  1,048 
China and others  0.235  1.524  8.52 **  0.628  1.669  27.15**  692 
Other than China  0.183  0.532  4.59 **  0.241  1.239  2.92*  630 
Unknown 0.226  0.716  1.3  0.458  0.525  -  473 
F-Statistics  1.36  1.01 -  2.61**  1.19 -  2,843 
 
  When both industry and firm size are controlled for, investment location becomes 
inconsequential, except for the small-firm group where those investing in China only 
registered the lowest employment growth rate, as compared to those investing outside 
of China. This seems to suggest that job displacement, if there is any, may affect small   12
firms that choose to invest solely in China. 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF FDI ON EMPLOYMENT 
In this section, we estimate the statistical effects of FDI on employment, using a 
production function to portray the relationship between domestic and overseas 
operations. We basically treat overseas operation and domestic operation as joint 
production which can be portrayed by an appropriate production function. The output 
from overseas production may serve as an intermediate input to domestic production, 
thereby reducing the cost of domestic production; by so doing, this reduces the 
demand for domestic primary inputs, including labor. The output from overseas 
production may also add to the burden of domestic operations if it requires managerial 
and technical support from the headquarters. Here, we treat the output from both 
overseas and domestic operations as two joint outputs from centrally-managed 
production aimed at minimizing overall costs. 
  We employ the generalized Leontief production function developed by Diewert 
(1971) and Hall (1973) to portray a cross-border operation yielding two distinctive 
outputs Y1 and Y2; where Y1 is the output from domestic operations and Y2 is that from 
foreign operations. There are three kinds of labor inputs to production, namely 
managerial workers, technical workers and blue-collar workers. Labor is finely 
classified because we are concerned about the effects of FDI on different kinds of 
labor, given the complexity of the international division of labor. Three kinds of 
workers constitute a composite labor input underlying which is a sub-production 
function. The relationship between this composite labor input and capital is a Leontief 
relationship; therefore the demand for labor can be solely determined by output levels 
and wages, irrespective of capital input. We can therefore depict the cost function of 
the composite labor as follows:   13
()
3 1 2 1 18 3 2 2 1 17
2 1 2 1 16 3 1 2 15 3 2 2 14
2 1 2 13 3 2 1 12 3 1 1 11
2 1 1 10 2 1 3 9 2 1 2 8 2 1 1 7




2 2 2 2
, , , ,
W W Y Y W W Y Y
W W Y Y W W Y W W Y
W W Y W W Y W W Y
W W Y Y Y W Y Y W Y Y W




β β β β




+ + + +
+ + + + + =
 
 where  C is the total cost of labor; and W1, W2 and W3 are the respective unit costs 
of managerial workers, technical workers and blue-collar workers. Note that outputs 
1 Y ,  2 Y  are measured by value-added in NT dollar terms. The sample covers firms 
from various industries and value-added is the only meaningful measuring unit 
common to all industries. 
  Although generalized Leontief production function restricts the production 
technology to be constant returns to scale, it does allow the elasticity of substitution 
(or complementarity) between three kinds of labor to be flexible. The 
inter-relationship between different kinds of labor in production is the focus of our 
study. 
  Using Shepherd’s lemma, we may derive the labor demand equation for each 
kind of worker: 
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 where  L1,  L2 and L 3 denote managerial, technical and blue-collar workers,   14
respectively. 
  We may use seemingly unrelated regressions to estimate Equation (1), taking into 
consideration the fact that disturbance terms in the three single equations may be 
somehow correlated. In undertaking the regression, we should impose cross-equation 
restrictions on parameters to ensure that the same estimate is produced for any parameter 
that appears in more than one equation. From the parameter estimates, we can easily 
measure the effects of Y1 and Y2 on each kind of labor demand, as shown in Equation (1). 
  In order to measure the quantity of labor, data was drawn from the latest survey 
on employment undertaken by Taiwan’s Bureau of Labor Affairs (BOLA) in 1999. 
The survey classifies labor into nine categories, but these nine categories are far too 
many to handle and also contain many zeros; therefore, they are combined into three 
categories to suit our purposes: (i) supervisors (managers), administrative and 
professional staff are classified as managerial workers; (ii) engineers, technicians and 
specialists are classified as technical workers; and (iii) operators, laborers and service 
workers are classified as blue-collar workers. The raw data drawn from the three 
small labor categories are converted into a large category, using the Divisia index, 
with each sample mean being normalized to unity. We thus obtained the measures for 
L1 (managerial workers), L2 (technical workers), and L3 (blue-collar workers).   
 Wage  rates  W1, W2, W3 are obtained by dividing the respective total wage bills by 
the measures of L1, L2 and L3. The data for domestic output (Y1) and overseas output 
(Y2) are obtained from the 1999 Survey on Overseas Investment by Manufacturing 
Firms undertaken by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). This survey also 
provides information on investment locations, but it only covers manufacturing firms 
that possess overseas affiliates. The BOLA and MOEA surveys are combined to yield 
394 observations, all of which are firms engaged in FDI. We then randomly drew 140 
non-FDI firms from the BOLA survey in order to supplement the observations using   15
firms without overseas affiliates. The total of 140 was taken so as to make the ratio of 
FDI to non-FDI firms roughly 3:1. The combined sample of 534 firms form the basis 
of our regression analysis, but only 451 of them contain complete data for entry into 
the regression estimation. Both MOEA and BOLA surveys covered firms of all sizes, 
so there is no selection bias problem associated with size. The regression results are 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5    Regression estimates of generalized Leontief production function 
 
Independent Valuables  Parameter Estimates  t-Statistic 
Dependent variable: Managerial workers (L1)   
Y1 -1.639×10
-2 0.299 
Y2 0.391  3.110
** 




Y1W13 0.103  3.152
** 








Dependent variable: Technical workers (L2)    
Y1 0.389  3.014
** 
Y2 0.739  3.985
** 




Y1W23 -0.131  2.230
** 
Y2W21 -0.449  3.068
** 






Dependent variable: Blue-collar workers (L3)   
Y1 0.205  4.116** 
Y2 0.195  3.514** 
YY -0.160  -2.541** 
Y1W31 0.103  3.408** 
Y1W32 -0.131  -2.380** 
Y2W31 -3.610×10
-2 0.992 
Y2W32 -0.125  2.101** 
YYW31 -5.645×10
-2 1.187 
YYW32 0.177 2.254** 
 
Notes: 
1     System weighted R
2 = 0.5649 
2   Degree  of  freedom:  1335 
3   Y Y =  ( Y 1Y2) 
1/2;  Y1W12= Y1W1
-1/2 W 2
1/2;  Y1W13= Y1W1
-1/2 W 3
1/2;  Y2W12= Y2W1
-1/2 W 2











  From Equation (1), we can derive the effects of domestic output (Y1) and overseas 
output (Y2) on labor demand. They are respectively,   16
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  If we fit the parameter estimates into Equations (2) and (3), we obtain the estimated 
effects of Y1 and Y2 on labor demand. The values of Y1 and Y2, and W1, W2 and W3, are 
taken to be the sample means. We estimate these effects for firms investing in different 
locations as we did in the previous section. The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6    Effects of domestic and overseas production on employment 
 
Managerial Technical Blue-collar 












Investing in China only (136)  0.1760  -0.0291  0.2988  -0.0413  0.1412  -0.0481 
Investing  in  China  and  others  (126)  0.1847 -0.0286 0.2831 -0.0387 0.1264 -0.0220 
Investing  outside  China  (113)  0.1762 -0.0307 0.3018 -0.0533 0.1559 -0.0845 
 
Note:    Domestic and overseas production is estimated in NT$ billions. 
 
  It can be seen from Table 6 that the demand for all kinds of labor increases with an 
increase in domestic output. For example, for those firms investing in China only, the 
demand for managerial workers increases by 0.1760 for each NT$ billion (Taiwanese 
currency) increase in domestic output (as Y1 is measured in NT$ billions). Since the 
Divisia index for labor has been normalized, this figure implies that in comparison with   17
the sample mean, there is an increase of 17.60 per cent in managerial workers. Similarly 
for each NT$ billion increase in domestic output, the demand for technical workers 
increases by 29.88 per cent, and the demand for blue-collar workers increases by 14.12 
per cent. The results indicate that by 1999, the expansion in domestic production had 
led to an expansion in all three kinds of labor, although technical personnel tended to 
benefit the most, followed by managerial staff, and then blue-collar workers the least. 
This pattern prevails across all investment locations, despite the fact that firm size 
differs significantly across different subgroups. This implies that the output effect on 
employment is mainly driven by the nature of technology which, as Taiwanese industry 
intensifies its technology content, tends to favor technical workers. 
  Table 7 lists the mean values of Y1 and Y2 for the different FDI subgroups. It can 
be seen that the subgroup of firms investing in China only is the smallest of the three 
groups in terms of domestic output, followed by the subgroup investing in China plus 
other regions, with the subgroup investing only outside of China being the largest. 
However, the subgroup investing in China and other regions also has the highest 
overseas production ratio, at 0.702, followed by the ‘China only’ subgroup at 0.475, 
and then the ‘outside China’ subgroup at 0.292. 
 
Table 7    Sample means, by FDI group 
Unit: NT$ Million 
FDI Location  Domestic Output Overseas  Output 
Overseas/   
Domestic Ratio 
No. of Samples 
  China  only  1,795.3  851.9  0.475  136 
  China  and  others  3,995.0  2,805.8  0.702  126 
  Other  than  China  5,591.1  1,633.8  0.292  113 
 
  Referring back to Table 6 also shows that overseas production has exerted a 
uniformly negative effect on each kind of labor, which suggests that when holding 
domestic output constant, domestic employment for a firm engaging in overseas 
production will decline by between 2 per cent and 8 per cent. This implies that 
overseas production complements domestic production and therefore reduces the need   18
for labor inputs at any given output level. However, we should not jump to the 
conclusion that overseas production reduces domestic employment, because such a 
complementary relationship also cuts down the cost of domestic production, thus 
enhancing the competitiveness of the company as a whole, which in turn, may lead to 
an expansion in domestic output. In other words, overseas production exerts a 
substitution effect which reduces the demand for labor at any given domestic output, 
as well as an output effect which expands domestic production. The net result has to 
take both effects into account, thus, it is the output effect to which we now turn. 
  We take the Manufacturers Census data, and choose the firms that have survived 
throughout the period under study, to explore the effects of FDI on domestic output. A 
simple regression is employed to estimate this effect: 
IND DFI DFI DFI DFI LY LY 6 4 5 3 4 2 3 1 2 1 0 93 99 α α α α α α α + + + + + + =   (4) 
  where the variables are as follows: 
99 LY :   logarithm of domestic output in 1999; 
93 LY :   logarithm of domestic output in 1993; 
1 DFI :    dummy variable for firms investing in China only; 
2 DFI :   dummy variable for firms investing in China and other regions; 
3 DFI :   dummy variable for firms investing only outside China; 
4 DFI :   dummy variable for firms investing in unknown regions; 
IND:    dummy variable for high-growth industries. 
  In Equation (4), we use the output in the base year (i.e. 1993), to project the 
output in the future year, 1999. Thus the coefficient  1 α  reflects the average growth 
rate between 1993 and 1999. The dummy variables, DFI1 - DFI4, capture the extra 
growth attributable to overseas investments and the dummy variable, IND, captures   19
the extra growth attributable to industry affiliation. Included in the regression analysis 
were a total of 50,164 firms that survived the 1993-1999 period. The results are 
reported in Table 8, which shows that the coefficients for dummy variables, DFI1 - 
DFI4, were all positive and statistically significant. This suggests that foreign 
investment does indeed contribute to extra growth in output after controlling for the 
industry effect.   
Table 8    Effect of FDI on domestic output 
 
Dependent Variable: LY99 Parameter  Estimates t-Statistic 
Intercept 1.217  44.562
** 
LY93 0.869  303.763
** 
Investing in China only (DFI1) 0.180  5.573
** 
Investing in China and others (DFI2) 0.517  9.288
** 
Investing outside China (DFI3) 0.464  13.071
** 
Unknown FDI regions (DFI4) 0.424  10.530
** 




1   R
2=0.6818 
2   F-Statistic=17915.45 
3   Degrees  of  freedom:  50,158 
 
  Compared to non-FDI firms, firms investing only in China recorded extra growth 
of 18 per cent over the 1993-1999 period; those firms that invested in China and other 
regions gained an extra 51.7 per cent; and those whose investment was only outside of 
China achieved 46.4 per cent growth. The gains may be different, but other things 
being equal, FDI has indeed expanded their domestic output.   
  We can therefore estimate the output effect of FDI on domestic production, using 
these estimates; that is, our aim is to estimate the additional domestic output which is 
attributable to FDI. 






• + = ∆ α
α
1
1 1 Y Y  
 where  α  corresponds to the location of investment. This output effect is to be 
added to the substitution effect to come up with the net effect of overseas production 


















                      
(5)
 
  where the first term reflects the output effect and the second term reflects the 
substitution effect. 
  Inserting the relevant parameter estimates into Equation (5), using the relations 
established in Equation (4), we obtain the estimates for total employment effect 
arising from FDI. These are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9    Overall effect of FDI on domestic employment 
 
  Managerial workers  Technical workers  Blue-collar workers 
Investing in China only  0.0402  0.0717  0.0277 
Investing in China and others  0.1185  0.1933  0.0755 
Investing outside of China  0.0833  0.1415         -0.0237 
 
  It can be seen from Table 9 that the total employment effects on FDI are positive 
for all kinds of labor and for all investment locations, with the exception of those 
investments undertaken outside of China. For the sub-group investing only outside of 
China, domestic employment of blue-collar workers is adversely affected by FDI (a 
decline of 2.37 per cent). The table also shows that technical workers are the biggest 
winners from FDI; regardless of the investment locations, the greatest increase is in the 
domestic employment of technical workers. We interpret this outcome as reflecting the 
fact that domestic production in recent years has been restructured towards more 
technology-intensive methods. Managerial workers also gain substantially from FDI, 
but not as much as their technical counterparts. Blue-collar workers gain the least and 
they may occasionally even lose. Capital outflow favoring technical workers was also 
found in Feenstra (1996), whilst Blomstrom, et. al. (1997) found that it favored 
managerial staff. In short, FDI may well affect different labor groups in different ways, 
but the overall effect is more likely to be positive than negative. The group which is 
most likely to feel any negative effects is the blue-collar group of workers. 
  It is noticeable that firms simultaneously investing in China and other regions   21
create the greatest proportion of new jobs at home. We take this subgroup of firms to 
be truly in pursuit of globalization, since globalization leads to an expansion of 
domestic production. This also manifests itself in the largest parameter estimate for 
DFI2 amongst all DFIs. Those investing only in China do not create as much demand 
for technical and managerial workers at home because production in China is 
characterized by a low technology requirement and simple production arrangements. 
  Going back to Table 3 in which domestic employment is shown to decline for 
firms investing only in China, we may conclude that FDI, per se, is not to blame for 
the plight of labor; it is instead the fact that these investors belong to low-growth (or 
even declining) industries, as well as being small in size, that account for their 
inability to maintain their employment levels at home. In addition to the industry 
effect, the fact that the ‘China-only’ group did not generate as much output expansion 
effect as the other investment groups also contributes to their below-par performance. 
Although China production enhances the competitiveness of domestic production, just 
like other overseas production, it also takes market opportunities away from Taiwan 
because Chinese and Taiwanese suppliers are often viewed by foreign buyers 
(particularly in the Western markets) as close substitutes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we study the effects of FDI on domestic employment by examining the data 
of Taiwan’s manufacturing industry. In terms of growth in their number of employees, 
those firms investing abroad have outperformed those firms that have not undertaken 
such investment. Moreover, firms that have invested abroad have a higher probability of 
survival than the ‘have-nots’; survival relies upon maintaining jobs at home. 
  Treating domestic production and overseas production as two distinctive but 
interrelated outputs from a joint production function, we may estimate the effects of   22
overseas production on domestic production, and thereafter, the consequences for 
domestic employment. Our study of Taiwanese manufacturing data indicates that 
overseas production reduces the demand for labor in domestic operations at any given 
domestic output. This implies that through ‘joint production’, overseas production 
reduces the input requirements at home to yield a given domestic output. In other words, 
overseas production substitutes for primary inputs in the domestic production process.   
  From a presumption of cost-minimization, this implies that overseas production 
complements domestic production to reduce the overall costs of cross-border 
operations, thereby enhancing the competitiveness of a company; this is to be 
achieved through a division of labor between the headquarters and the affiliates. Such 
enhanced competitiveness, in turn, helps firms to expand their domestic output, which 
leads to an increase in the demand for labor. Therefore, the total effect of FDI on 
domestic employment is a combination of output expansion effect and input 
substitution effect. Our estimates show that, in most cases, the output expansion effect 
more than offsets the input substitution effect to yield a net positive effect on domestic 
employment; however, the magnitude of employment effect arising from FDI differs 
across different labor groups.   
  In the case of Taiwan, technical workers tend to benefit most from FDI, followed 
by managerial workers, with blue-collar workers benefiting the least; indeed they may 
even be adversely affected. This implies that after overseas investment has taken place, 
a reconfiguration of the division of labor within a firm will tend to shift domestic 
production toward technology- and management-intensive operations. 
  Different investment locations exert slightly different impacts on domestic 
employment mainly because of the differences in output expansion effect. Those firms 
that invest only in China contribute the least to the expansion of domestic output, 
followed by firms that invest only outside of China, whilst FDI covering both China   23
and other regions is most conducive to domestic output expansion. 
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